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**Constituency Politics and Public Policymaking:  
Dilemma of Development Projects in Rawalpindi District in Pakistan**

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**Abstract:**

Policymaking involves various power structures, stakeholders, and interest groups, all of which have an individual and collective impact on policy formulation, design, and implementation. In the political context, constituency is crucial, and policy programs in democratic systems are influenced by various constituency mechanics. In the case of Pakistan, internal migration and urbanization over the last four decades coupled with population increase have changed demographics in various urban constituencies giving rise to new power structures. The problem with the political system is that, while politically motivated choices in development projects are made to ensure societal welfare, they sometimes triumph over the public policy process and serve as instruments of power entrenchment and perpetuation. This study investigates whether political parties formulate policies to win elections or to ensure societal welfare? The objective of the study is to get empirical data to unveil the underlying political machinations at work, from inception to conclusion of developmental projects, and measure the impact of such considerations on the efficacy of the immediate project. The qualitative and quantitative methods were applied to gather data and results. SPSS was used for analysis of association among variables, regression analysis and tests of significance.

**Keywords:** Pakistan, constituency politics, policymaking process, development funds, development projects, logrolling

**INTRODUCTION**

Political parties are an essential component of a democratic system of governance. They compete in elections and mobilize citizens behind their particular visions of society through their previous or promised performance in the legislature. They offer citizens, meaningful choices in governance, avenues for political participation, and opportunities for socio-economic benefits. A political party as a unit can have different orientations and makeup. A well-known academic taxonomy is to categorize them vis-à-vis their propensity to change: leftist parties advocate for more progressive

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and radical reform measures, right-wingers opting for a conservative approach towards socio-economic and political issues. The centrists, both Centre-left and Centre-right, try to strike the balance and reconciliation between both extremes. Another important taxonomy, which assumes significance in third-world states, is a categorization of political parties along with a particular ideology/manifesto or group of electable. The parties with a revolutionary manifesto often fight their election campaigns on their program and agenda and associate little importance with the candidate – the implication that the voter would see the manifesto and vote instead of vote for a particular candidate who can deliver the goods; the premise of such political parties being that their program for reforms and popularity of such programs at the grass-root level is such that the candidate profile would make little or no difference.

On the other hand, the political party which assumes the form of a group of electable mostly relies on the popularity of the candidate in a particular constituency. The manifesto doesn't promise a radical change and most of the work for winning the election is left to the candidate, who has to muster support by manipulating the power structures at the constituency. It must be noted that these two taxonomies are not mutually exclusive. Quite often, most parties brand themselves as revolutionaries and at the same time go for electable in certain constituencies.

### **Constituency Mechanics**

Within a democratic system, the constituency politics and the mechanics governing its working are of vital importance. The constituency as a unit has its own dynamics, power structures, influence and power groups as well as a class of voters that may not be similar in outlook with even the adjacent constituency.

The public policy process acknowledges the presence of such forces at the constituency level and considers their role to formulate the most appropriate of the policies and programs. In third-world countries, due to low literacy, lack of democratic culture and absence of accountability mechanisms, the rationality and farsightedness of the public policy process is often triumphed by expediency and immediate benefits. Though this contention doesn't assume omnipresence in all the constituencies of a country, it does hold its ground in quite a few of them.

### **Political Parties and Constituency Mechanics in Pakistan**

The political parties in Pakistan can be classified through the two taxonomies discussed above. Going by the first taxonomy, Pakistan has no purely leftist political party; though many parties started as leftist ones, over the decades, they have morphed into a centre-left outfit. The majority of the parties are either centre-left, centre-right or far-right. Then, as explained above, each party has a certain size of electables within its ranks, besides proclaiming to assess a radical reforms manifesto and change program.

The constituency details in Pakistan offer a unique case. At the time of the partition, it was an agricultural and predominantly rural country. With industrialization throughout its history and massive urbanization and migration in the last three decades, it has become South Asia's fastest urbanizing country with more than 40% of the population living in urban and semi-urban localities. Resultantly, the power structures in the constituencies of urban and rural centers differ greatly. While the rural constituencies still hold to the Biradri and clan linkages, the urban centers are

dominated by an array of stakeholders and groups, including but not limited to, traders, industrialists, bureaucracy, and intelligentsia. The demographic change also makes its presence more felt in the urban localities; the youth factor played a major role in the last general elections held in 2013.

### **Power Distribution**

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has seen 33 years of military and 34 years of civil/quasi-civil system of governance. During the military interludes, the parliamentary democracy, inherited from the British, has been practiced and advocated and the country has seen three constitutions, the last one adopted in 1973. The federal structure of the country, defined in the constitution, provides three tiers of power: national assembly, provincial assemblies, and local governments. Each of these tiers has its own power mechanics and constituency dynamics. The mechanics of urban constituencies are more complex and due to bargaining and power struggle between different units, the public policy for developmental projects is affected as a result. The main stakeholders vying for their share and benefits are national assembly/provincial assembly representatives, government officials, local government politicians and public.

### **Problem Statement**

The problem lies in empirically checking such mechanics in constituency. The contention is that politically motivated choices in development projects, though, are initiated to ensure societal welfare, at times, end up triumphing public policy process and serve as instruments of power entrenchment and perpetuation.

### **Significance of the Study**

The preceding paragraphs mention that the success attainment in constituencies is quintessential for political parties, for which they practice constituency politics. Constituency politics varies from province to province and district to district. The rural-urban divide brings its own brand of stakeholders in the constituency equation and further complicates the development policy procedure.

Another important domain addressed indirectly by this effort would be beneficial in understanding the factors hampering the democratic interludes in Pakistani polity. Since the aim of any development project is the welfare of the masses, the general disillusionment amongst people at the grass root level is translated as apathy for democracy at the national level. The identification of different stakeholders and an objective understanding of their perspectives would help the policy makers in understanding their structures at the national level.

This research has been necessitated by dearth of literature on the consequences of 'lack of continuity' in the developmental projects. The rationale and purpose of this study lies in the vital importance of policy continuity in development projects for the welfare of the people. Since the constituency mechanics demand 'visibility' and the mega projects, many big projects are initiated prior to the elections which deal a decisive blow to the existing projects and their maintenance. The bid for re-election serves as the primary guiding force and the welfare of the people is affected due to abrupt changes in policy and discontinuing programs of the previous regimes after coming to

power. The purpose of this study is to study these contentious mechanisms in the light of empirical evidence and derive policy conclusions and recommendations.

The aim of this study to explore the nexus of various stakeholders in the political dynamics of constituency developmental projects. To study the impact of political machinations on the efficacy of the immediate projects and the impact on the general welfare of the society. To study the implementation of the whole public policy process through the lens of constituency development and see whether our contention holds valid or not. The study objective is to get empirical data to unveil the underlying political machinations at work, from inception to conclusion of developmental projects, measure the impact of such considerations on the efficacy of the immediate project and the impact on the general welfare of the society while remaining within the ambit of the selected constituencies. The study explores the question: Are development projects initiated at the cost of public welfare merely to win elections? Do political parties formulate policies to win elections or to ensure societal welfare?

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Politics and Political Parties**

Political parties form a fundamental foundation of democratic society. They combine the interests of the public, joint them in the form of policy options and ply structures for political participation. Public policymaking is not purely a technical function of government; rather it is a complicated synergistic process influenced by the different nature of socio-political and other environmental forces. These environmental forces that form the policy perspective led to the dispersion in policies and influence their output and their impact. Policy refers to a wide statement that indicates future goals and aspirations and provides guidelines for carrying out those goals. Hill (1993) defines as policy as *“the product of political influence, determining and setting limits to what the state does”*. Anderson (1975) defines more accurately explains policy more accurately *“when a government takes a decision or chooses a course of action in order to solve a social problem and adopts a specific strategy for its planning and implementation, it is known as public policy”*.

Policy is made for the welfare of the society/ general public but is channelized via different political parties, interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals, which range from material self-interest to high-minded idealism. A famous economics and theorist stated in his book *“political parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate Policies”* (Downs, 1975).

The concept of constituency how, in any particular nation, the excluded are legitimately reconstituted prior to, or simultaneously, as they select their representatives who will rule them. The electoral constituency is the classical institution of official exclusion, for it defines this process. A constituency can refer to *“a body of citizens entitled to elect a representative to a lawmaking or administrative position”*, *“the inhabitants in an electoral district elect someone to represent them nationally are clearly one example of a core constituency, the latter may be further subdivided into a wider range of grouped interests”* (Rehfeld, 2005). US Congressmen (Davidson, 1979) also observed that representatives think about their constituencies more strategically, they perceive them as complex mosaics made up of subsidiary publics or clienteles reflecting - three *“concentric circles”* i.e; the geographic, demographic and political constituencies.

Legislators in developing countries commit corruption in legislative processes, budget policies, infrastructure projects, health policies, and service delivery. Politics in these countries is characterized by widespread political and electoral violence, intra-party squabbling, electoral malpractices, general insecurity of lives/properties, flagrant violations of human rights, rule of law, widespread corruption, repression of political opposition, and political apathy (Ogundiya, 2010). Furthermore, legislators engage three major objectives: reelections, control within the legislature and the formulation of good public policy. In most countries legislators represent geographically defined districts. While they may sincerely wish to do what is in the best interest of the entire country, the self-interest of different groups acts as a major obstacle. In the democratic government, every representative has their own self-interest. Legislatures make and execute public policy. In a democracy, the legislature is preferred to those policies which are beneficial for their constituencies and these policies become precedent for other constituencies. District-oriented assessment of grants often leads to the adoption of policies with net social costs as legislators deal with each other to get their share from the pork barrel. This procedure sometimes called logrolling, involves assembling a compilation of projects that provide enough locally perceived benefits to gain embracing of the packages as a bundle. The legislative process usually favours those policies that extend perceived benefits over a greater part of districts (Riker, 1973).

Representatives first participate in electoral contestation, after winning the election to gain public incumbency. In developed countries incumbency has lot of advantages that help to implement different sustainable social welfare projects. In developing countries, incumbency and rent-seeking have a lot of disadvantages. Legislatures and representatives prefer those policies which help them to secure their voters. For example, instead of making new schools, they prefer to recruit those candidates who belong to their constituency. Preference is cited to those development projects which help those who have donated a lot of money in the election season. Furthermore, preference is given for the development of those projects which provide help to those businessmen who have provided more incentives and helped to develop links with well-known personalities. When representatives get development funds, they do contracts with reputed companies and start different projects by hook or by crook in their designated constituency. At the times of elections, representatives start development projects without any feasibility report and research work. They even do not know the existing needs of poor people in their constituency and believe that feedback from poor people, local politicians, technocrats, and researcher is useless before the project starts (Cernea, 1997).

### **Policymaking Process**

Public policy is the study of government decisions and actions designed to deal with a matter of public concern. Public policy did not appear as a subfield of political science until the mid-1960s. First time policymaking process is presented by David Easton (1965). The policymaking process is based on five different stages: Problem identification, Policy formulation, Policy adoption process, Implementation/operation and Evaluation (Gross, 1967).

In the policymaking process, the first stage is problem identification. The public policy begins when a problem is perceived and gets on the policy agenda. Many problems exist in a society that does not become part of the policy agenda because they have not come to the attention of the authoritative actors in the government and therefore do not cause a policy response. Once a

problem gets into the issues go further towards the solution. Only important issues rest in agenda-setting and other issues disappear into a black hole. In agenda setting, two types of agendas exist systemic agenda and institutional agenda (Cobb, 1995).

- The systemic agenda is made up of those issues perceived by the political community as meriting public attention and resolution.
- The institutional agenda consists of those issues that receive the powerful and earnest attention of decision-makers. It includes those issues that are actively pursued through the various institution of government.
- Other things also present themselves in the agenda-setting, such as special interest groups, technocrats, scholars, media groups and agencies.

The second step is Policy Formulation: in this step, a plan is made on how to deal with problems. It is determined which objectives must be achieved and what are the alternatives available that effectively reduce the problem. During the policy formulation process, stakeholders should see the positive and negative externalities of each alternative.

Third step is policy adoption: The determination of how to make policy more legitimate and development of rules and regulations is done by gathering all available information about the problem and postulating the best way to achieve the desired goal.

Fourth step is implementation: Implementation means carrying out the policy or implementing the policy on the ground. According to Robert, implementation is “a continuation of policymaking by other means” (Sapru, 2004). Other factors that facilitate the policy are proper identification of the problem, good advice, perceived legitimacy and all stakeholders agreeing on one point.

The Fifth step is evaluation. In this step, all the steps of the policy are evaluated. Evaluation is an assessment of how a program achieves its intended goals.

### **Bureaucracy and Implementation of Policy**

Bureaucracy plays an important role in democratic government. Bureaucrat can be the secretary of the minister or can be the CEO of the government enterprises. Bureaucrats perform their administrative work at the top level as well as a grass-root level. Bureaucrats help ministers to formulate policies and also execute policies on the ground. In developed countries, bureaucracy performs its job very well as compared to developing countries. In developing countries, bureaucratic machinery is extremely rusty and incompetent because of the regular interference of the politicians and militants (Kalia, 2013).

In Pakistan, elaborate machinery for the planning and development projects exists but its performance has not been upto the mark (Sahibzada, 1992). Project history of Pakistan has shown that the process of project planning and implementation in the country has suffered from inherent problems ranging from conceptual differences about the projects. Hurriedly prepared project feasibility studies, deficient in proper technical and economic underpinning and lack of basic information obtained through insufficient investigation and survey to inadequate project monitoring and almost non-existing in-depth evaluation studies.

### **Constituency Development Funds (CDFs)**

The Center for International Development (2009) defines CDFs as “Constituency development fund is the generic name for a policy tool that dedicates public money to benefit specific political subdivisions through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by their representatives in the national parliament (Van Zyl, 2010)”.

In many democratic countries CDF is distributed equally among constituencies but the needy and affected people don't need to get a benefit. When the representatives of the constituency get CDFs, they should start suitable projects; those that fulfil the needs of the general public. Most of the time utilization of CDFs is not effective for general people and representatives target those areas where the vote banks are situated in the large area. CDFs are funding provisions that trickle-down money from the federal government to electoral constituencies for local development projects. The purpose of CDFs defined by Uganda's President Kikwete (2008) stated that the “CDFs will help out MPs in implementing development projects (reconstruction of schools, colleges and roads) and reduce the ‘daily nuisances’ that MPs face in their constituencies” (Mallya, 2013).

In Philippines, politicians tend to hold on to their PDAF (Philippine CDF) funds until just before an election and invest in election campaigns: “A few months before the 2004 elections, a publicist of several members of the House estimated that more than half of all congressmen had not touched their pork for projects, saving it instead for re-election purposes” (Chua, 2004).

In the regime of Mohammed Khan Junejo upgraded the same program of granting a developmental grant of Rs.50 lakh to each member of the National Assembly. Thus, emerged a new nexus of politicians and administrators (Shafqat, 1998). In several instances, these grants were not properly utilized; funds were misappropriated and in some cases were usurped by politicians for self-enrichment. At the popular level, democracy was seen as promoting corruption and not development.

### **METHODOLOGY**

Since the information required for the hypothetical of study is based on opinions of the legislatures (MNA), Government Officials, Local Politicians as well as General Public of the concerned constituency, therefore, the primary data is qualitative. However, to ensure the reliability of the results some quantitative measures are used.

These two methods provide quite essential guidelines for answering the research questions with the help of sub-questions (questionnaires) survey research design. Quantitative research methodology was chosen, as this research requires empirical evidence to substantiate it further. Whereas non-probability sampling method has been used for obtaining quantitative data. The evidence and related literature obtained aided in the analysis of data and also helped to reach a plausible conclusion.

### **Hypothesis of the Study**

The current study is based on the hypothesis of whether the development projects are truly intended to prevail social welfare in the society or they are just cosmetic solutions to get visibility which might help the political parties to gain political power and win elections in the forth coming elections.

## Research Design

Based on extensive literature review, a conceptual framework of study has been developed as Constituency Policy, Legislator, Allocation of Funds and Development Outcomes; independent variables of Constituency Politics and its effects would be analyzed on the Effectiveness of the Development Projects as a dependent variable. These four factors have a considerably major impact on the Effectiveness of the Development Projects. In this research positive and negative correlation among variables has been examined. The aim is to examine the strength between one independent and one dependent variable.

**Table. 1.1**

Effectiveness of the Development Projects	Constituency Policy			
	Government Officials		General Public	
	Pearson Correlation	Significance	Pearson Correlation	Significance
	0.756	0.007	0.326	0.000
	Legislators			
	0.954	0.000	-0.650	0.006
	Allocation of Funds			
0.738	0.000	0.541	0.000	
Projects Outcomes				
0.798	0.003	0.571	0.000	

Source: Own Collection based on data attained from Rawalpindi Constituencies

The above table shows the responses of two respondents; Government Officials and the General Public. According to Government Officials, constituency policy and effectiveness of the development projects have a strongly positive relation. Pearson value (0.756) shows the strong positive relation between variables. According to General Public, the correlation between Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects is significant and positive. Pearson Correlation value is (0.326). Although, the value of correlation is lower, as compared to the value shown in the column of Government Officials. It is because General Public do not consider the Constituency Policy as strong as Government Officials do. All the independent variables constituency policy, legislators, Allocation of funds and projects outcomes show a positive relationship among variables. Government Officials believe that these independent variables have a much stronger relationship with the dependent variable (Effectiveness of the development projects). On the other hand, General Public believes that either these independent variables have a positive relationship with the dependent variable and show the level of significance but these relationships are not as strong as Government Officials believed. General Public believed that legislators have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the development projects as Pearson value (-0.650) shows in the table.

**Table:1.2.**

Effective-ness of the Development Projects	Linear Relationship among Variables									
	Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects									
	Government Officials					General Public				
	Beta Value	Std. error	T-value	Sig	Beta Value	Std. error	T-value	Sig		
	0.889	0.246	3.618	0.006	0.066	0.055	1.200	0.231		
Legislators and Effectiveness of the Development Projects										
	0.929	0.097	9.601	0.000	0.040	0.056	0.708	0.480		



<b>Allocation of Funds and Effectiveness of the Development Projects</b>										
Beta Value	0.844	0.225	3.754	0.005	Beta Value	0.104	0.062	1.671	0.096	
<b>Projects Outcomes and Effectiveness of the Development Projects</b>										
Beta Value	0.425	0.107	3.972	0.003	Beta Value	0.040	0.066	0.576	0.565	

Source: Own Collection based on data attained from Rawalpindi Constituencies

Table 1.2 shows the responses of Government officials and General Public about the effect of Constituency Policy on Effectiveness of the Development Projects. Table provides beta values, St. error, t-value and level of significance of independent variables (Constituency Policy, legislators, Allocation of Funds and Projects Outcomes). In the table, very 1<sup>st</sup> Column shows the dependent variable (Effectiveness of the Development Projects). According to the Government Officials, Beta value (0.889) shows that Constituency Policy plays a positive role in the Effectiveness of the Development Project. If other variables outside the model remain constant and there is a one percent increase in Constituency Policy, the effectiveness of the development project will increase by 88 percent. It means Government Officials 88% sure that Constituency policy and the Effectiveness of development Projects has strong relation. On the other hand, according to general public, Constituency Policies do not play their part in the Effectiveness of the Development Projects as much as it should be. Beta value (0.066) explains that the constituency policies contribute only 6 percent of their role while explaining the Effectiveness of the Development Projects. Significance level is 0.000 is less than 0.05 therefore Constituency Policy significantly explains the variation in Effectiveness of the Development Projects. Minimal Beta value 0.066 shows that Constituency Policy slightly contributes to the Effectiveness of the Development Projects.

According to the Government Officials, Beta values of Legislators (0.929), Allocation of Funds (0.844), and Projects Outcomes (0.425) play positive role in the Effectiveness of the Development Project. Significance levels of all the independent variables are less than 0.05 therefore independent variables significantly explain the variation in Dependent Variable (Effectiveness of the Development Projects). According to the General Public, Beta values of Legislators (0.040), Allocation of Funds (0.104), and Projects Outcomes (0.045) play not positive role in the Effectiveness of the Development Project. General Public believed that Legislators (4%), Allocation of Funds (10%), and Projects Outcomes (5%) contribute in development projects. Significance levels of all the independent variables are above than 0.05 therefore independent variables not significantly explain the variation in Dependent Variable (Effectiveness of the Development Projects).

The “t” tests are used to conduct hypothesis tests on the regression coefficients obtained in simple linear regression. In table 1.2 shows the column of “t-value” aside with level of significance. Table 1.2 shows the responses of Government officials and General Public about the effect of independent variables on dependent variable. In the proceeding table T-value help to accept or reject the hypothesis (Null  $(H_0)$  or Alternative  $(H_1)$ ).

$$\text{t-value} = \frac{\text{Beta value } 0.889}{\text{St. error } 0.246} = 3.613$$

### Test of significance

In order to test the significance, proceed as follows,

Ho:  $P \neq 0$  i.e. there is no significant relation between Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects.


H1:  $P = 0$  i.e. there exist a significant relation between Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects.

Level of significance = 0.05

The critical region for  $\alpha = 0.05$

$$R_{0.05(10)} = 2.228$$

The calculated value of  $t = 3.618$



Reject Null Hypothesis

According to Government Officials “t” value (3.618) falls in the rejection region therefore we reject null hypothesis and may conclude that there exists a significant relation between Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects.

**On the other side: The General Public shows the Opposite statics.**

In order to test the significance, proceed as follows,

Ho:  $P \neq 0$  i.e. there is no significant relation between Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects.


H1:  $P = 0$  i.e. there exist a significant relation between Constituency Policy and Effectiveness of the Development Projects.

Level of significance = 0.05

The critical region for  $\alpha = 0.05$

$$R_{0.05(398)} = 1.96$$

The calculated value of  $t = 1.20$



Reject Null Hypothesis

“t” value (1.20) falls in the critical region therefore we accept null hypothesis and may conclude that there is no significant relation between Constituency Policy and effectiveness of development projects.

Based on the responses of Government officials “t-values” of the independent variables indicate that Constituency policy (3.618), Legislators (9.601), Allocation of funds (3.754) and Projects outcomes (3.972) have a strong relationship with the dependent variable. All the “t” values of independent variables fall in the rejection region therefore we reject the null hypothesis and may conclude that there exists a significant relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.

On the other hand, based on the responses of the General Public “t-values” of the independent variables indicate that Constituency policy (1.200), Legislators (0.708), Allocation of funds (1.671) and Projects outcomes (0.576) have no relationship with the dependent variable. All the “t” values of independent variables fall in the critical region therefore we accept null hypothesis and may conclude that there is no significant relation between independent variables and dependent variables.

### **Discussion on Constituency Policy**

The majority of public is of the view that constituency policies, in an actual sense, are good but in our region, constituency policies are formulated for securing re-election instead of the welfare of the public. The residents in a particular constituency elect someone to represent them nationally, raise their problems in assembly and resolve their problems with the appropriate policies. Before elections, non-elected representatives appear with the party and individual manifesto. In the manifesto, they mention different declarations with valuable projects which are fertile for the constituency. But after winning the election, representatives disappear from their constituency with their manifesto and promises. Some people say that representatives only appear at the election times. Before elections, representatives abruptly start different projects without knowing what the existing needs and requirements of the constituency are. Most of the time in urban constituencies, representatives start big infrastructural projects just before the elections but later on these projects become white elephants. A lot of money, time and resources is invested on these projects but in the long run, these projects have no sustainability. In Rawalpindi city, a lot of development projects were started before the election i.e. two flyovers on Muree road and completed in the record time, one is Chandni Chowk fly-over at a cost of Rs.1.25 billion (120 days) and another fly-over on the 6<sup>th</sup> road at cost of 1.024 billion (140 days) which is unable to resolve the traffic problem at peak hours. Another project expansion of the Marir Chowk started in 2012 at a cost of Rs.429 million and this project is still in progress. These projects were started due to election pressure without proper planning and therefore, their execution became a big hurdle in the construction of the Metro Bus service (Javed,2014). According to the view of local government politicians in five-year tenure 2008-2013, only one new college was approved under the supervision of an MNA and it is still under construction at the end of 2014. Not a single new school and college were constructed in both constituencies (NA-55 and NA-56). One college was also started by the previous government (PML-Q) in their tenure and this college remains incomplete. Approximately Rs.42 million rupees were spent on the college but it is not operational till the end of 2013.

In view of Government Official, national representatives and provincial assembly representatives, many development projects were started for the welfare of the society but people do not realize their worth and value.

### **Discussion on Legislators**

Most of the public believes that the purpose of legislators is to create, change, and mitigate law for the benefit of society, and that people benefit when policies are implemented rationally. According to the public, legislators adopt policies that are beneficial to their party and also serve their interests. Every new government representative implements policies that reject previous government projects in favor of new development projects, causing the constituency to suffer significant financial losses. These projects initiated by one regime are rarely completed and are frequently replaced by the signature projects of newcomers to power. For instance, PML Q started T.B hospital located at Eidghah Road in NA-55 constituency. When the next government came in power (2008) they bunged the work of T.B hospital and replaced it with a new hospital in NA-56. In 2008 to 2013 construction of three new hospitals was started in the constituency (NA-56) and only one cardiology hospital was completed by the hook and crook before the elections. Rest of two (Kidney and Neurology) hospitals is not operationalized yet. The completion of these hospitals, according to the public, is more important than the completion of the Metro bus service project. Another example is the Lai Express Way, which cost nearly 2 billion rupees to build and is now a sunk cost. The new government replaced Lai Expressway with some infrastructure projects and Metro Bus Service. According to the view of Government Official and MPs, the old projects started losing their efficacy with the passage of time and that is why they are replaced by new projects and signature programs.

### **Discussion on Allocation of Funds**

According to the view of the public and local government politicians, funds are not properly executed and distributed on different projects. A lot of funds are utilized on those projects which have high visibility as compared to usability. Representatives of different constituencies hold onto the constituency development funds through the tenure and just before the elections start different projects. Representatives divert funds on those projects which belong to their party. Most of the time, representatives indulge in embezzlement and corruption in CDFs with the help of different contractors. Those representatives who have affiliations in the existing government get more funds. For instance, an ex-Prime Minister released funds worth approximately 47 billion rupees for his constituency just ten days before the completion of the government (2008-2013). According to the view of people, politicians use CDFs for their interest and party interest. The last government spent a lot on the development projects in Rawalpindi district but the city-site area is in very bad condition i.e. Streets and roads are in bad shape, drains are choked, streetlights don't work, and clean drinking water is not available in Chah Sultan, Raja Bazaar, Pirwadhai, Gowalmandi and other localities of the city; local Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (MPA) claimed that "for the Punjab government, Rawalpindi city is limited to NA-52, which is rural area".

On the other hand, Government officials and MPs are of the opinion that they executed funds on every sector within their jurisdiction. They mention that they reconstruct roads, school colleges and hospitals and they made best feasibility report and spent whole funds without any corruption.

### **Discussion on Projects Outcomes**

According to public opinion, most development projects initiated between 2008 and 2013 were ineffective. The cost of these projects was very high, and their usability was very low. According to

the public, some projects have usability, and some becomes white elephants. Most of the core projects that were started in last tenure (2008-2013) is still under construction. For example, out of three new hospitals two hospitals are still not operationalized. A lot of money is spent on new hospitals the existing hospitals are in very bad conditions medicines and machineries are not available in the hospitals. In wholly Family hospital angiography machine is not working for the last seven years. More the two patients occupied one bed. The existing structure of old hospitals is very pathetic. Flyovers during peak hours are not very effective. Due to weak planning and lack of coordination of development projects sewerage system become worse, people are becoming the victim of different diseases. Roads, streets, and infrastructure are in very bad conditions. More than 65% public denied their perception about outcomes of different projects.

## **CONCLUSION**

Constituency politics and policy development is an active area of interest for the scientists and theorists of public policy. Recently, many researchers are trying to explore this important link and how this nexus exerts great impact on the life of the masses as well as primary stakeholders.

This study examines the relationship between constituency politics and policy making in the development projects and used the constituencies of Rawalpindi district. In this regard, the views of two clusters of stakeholders are important to understand. The government officials and national/provincial representatives contend that the projects are always initiated in the best interest of the masses and the political machinations, embezzlement and re-election bids is never the priority of the policy makers. On the other hand, through our surveys and interviews, the opinion of general public and local politicians is entirely different. They assert that the project initiation, CDF utilization, incumbency/re-election and party interests are always prioritized, and the policy initiatives are, in fact, a legal tool to give legitimacy to the political programs of different parties.

This review study has empirically proven that our null hypothesis holds true and that development projects are initiated to gain political power and win elections through association among variables, regression analysis, and tests of significance. The relationship between the variables, as well as the regression results, are sufficient to support the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis.

Our interactions with various stakeholders during data collection, surveys, and interviews also enabled us to develop a number of recommendations that would serve as policy guidelines for elected representatives in order to devise effective measures to counteract this trend. The following section describes these recommendations and policy guidelines.

## **Recommendations**

Continuity in development projects is of key importance as far as the welfare of the public is concerned. In this research, empirically explored many reasons which lead to the shelving of development projects in the middle; the reasons are mostly political and personal and NOT the feasibility and usability of the projects. Legislation may ensure that the bureaucracy and technocrats responsible for feasibility and other related works, be held accountable and the development projects once kicked off should be completed irrespective of the party in power. Also,

the legislation should set regular performance benchmarks, evaluation standards and efficacy measurement of the projects.

A proper accountability mechanism for development projects can solve the issues of embezzlement of CDF. The accountability provision may either be enshrined in the legislation or a separate body may be constituted at the federal level to check the menace of corruption. This accountability body may be non-partisan and may receive consensus across both sides of the aisle.

The most important aspect of this body should be its non-political character. Over the decades, the degeneration of erstwhile Accountability Bureau and now the toothless National Accountability Bureau has been witnessed and pointed out by many different academics. While providing suitable recommendations for the reforms of NAB are beyond the scope of this study, propose a separate accountability body for checking corruption in development projects only. This mechanism would have two-pronged benefits:

1. The focus and orientation of such an accountability body would be easy to find
2. The accountability body would be less liable to discretionary powers and would not prod other irregularities committed by other officials of the governments – thus lacking the wheels necessary for political victimization and overstepping its prerogatives.

In this study, empirical analysis reveals that many projects are launched haphazardly before elections to gain short-term political benefits at the expense of public welfare. It is therefore recommended that public representatives not be paid for at least six months before the elections. In addition, evaluations and impact assessments may be conducted during this time period to assess the efficacy and usability of development projects initiated to inform and educate citizens.

Public representatives tend to opt for mega-development projects due to their visibility. However, as mentioned in this article, the dilapidated state of many existing institutions demands more and immediate attention. In this regard, it is suggested to the government officials as well as public representatives to carry out extensive surveys of the existing state of many institutions before initiating new projects.

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