



**Three Dimensional Global Counter-Terror Policy Response:
Assessing the Efficacy of Pakistan's National Action Plan**

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Abstract:

From 2001 to 2014, Pakistan initiated different short term counter terrorism strategies e.g. military operations and negotiations but most of the time these efforts proved to be short lived and militancy spoke at length with intervals. The establishment of NACTA in 2009 was supposed to work as a bridge between state security enforcement and intelligence agencies and government policy wings for curbing the menace of terrorism and extremism. In 2013, the authority was made the major state agency to combine state and security agencies response to counter terrorism and extremism. But still there was lack of a broader and all out CT-Policy. It took almost thirteen years' time span to come up with a national policy on homeland security, namely the National Internal Security Policy-14 (NISP-2014). The late enactment and lack of coordination in the implementation did not stop the devastating Army Public School incident which regenerated the debate about CT-Policy, which ultimately resulted in devising a comprehensive and broader policy; the National Action Plan 'NAP-2014'. The policy is a specimen of national consensus by all important sections of Pakistani state, government and politics. This paper assesses the efficacy of NAP. Qualitative method of research is applied, the research relies mainly on printed and electronic sources and both primary and secondary sources are consulted in the completion of the study.

Keywords: NACTA, NISP, NAP, counter terrorism, terrorism strategy, military operations

INTRODUCTION

"In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action" – George W. Bush

The tragedy of 9/11 made the world nations, to think for, and develop counter-terror mechanisms and strategies. Three main dimensions of security were evolved, namely: national level of security, regional level of security and global security (UNODC, 2009). To achieve all these levels of security, there needed a greater coordination on the part of UN member states. The Counter Terrorism Strategies (CTS's) required member states' government to undertake national level efforts according to a country's specific needs to minimize security risk at state level, then coordinate efforts at regional and global level. The national level mechanism needs greater coordination

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between security and law enforcement agencies, national governments and civil society and political parties. The coordination could only be achieved when national level consensus is achieved and broader outlines are reached for enacting a comprehensive 'CT-Policy'.

Strategy is the pattern or course of action for achieving certain objectives while policy provides guiding principles and give legality to the pattern of action underway to achieve targeted goals. But for achieving policy goals and applying course of action, planning is mandatory. Policy making is a tough task and many tangible and intangible tools are considered while drafting a policy e.g. social, political, economic and societal etc. But even after being taken all these tools, policies fail to achieve the perceived goals. Policy is the outcome of decision making process while a good and result oriented policy is the result of well laid decision making (FitzGerald, O'Malley, & Broin, 2019).

Policy presents solution for a 'problem' or 'issue', publically understood as a problem that requires immediate governmental interference for a course of action. Three main attributes of a good policy were described by 'FitzGerald et al' (2019) in their research which are: a) Standardized Practice; b) authoritative and rule-based; and c) expertise and knowledge about the issue. Another dimension of a good policy is "targeted population" and "beneficiaries" so under the certain policy guidelines, e.g. NISP-2014, extremists and terrorists were the first category i.e. the targeted population while state was the ultimate beneficiary because of getting rid of the scourge and minimizing security threats. Policies differ in objectivity; some policies are concise having limited goals while others have multiple goals. Now, the policies having set 'multiple-goals' and achievability differ, because most of the time all goals could not be achieved at one time and it takes long to measure the success of multiple-goals policy.

"Despite the seemingly never-ending scrutiny and claims [that a] 'policy has been successful', authoritative closure on the issue of a policy's success or otherwise can be difficult to achieve" (McConnell, 2010). National Action Plan (2014), the 'multiple-goals' policy, aimed at countering terrorism and improvising terrorist-landscape of the country while brining militants under trial and imposing strict punishments e.g. the penalty to death and disconnecting terrorists from their support bases are big goals (NACTA, 2017). The success of a policy requires greater coordination of all the stakeholders e.g. government, intelligence agencies and military establishment, etc. This study envisages the creation of the plan: *under which circumstances the NAP-2014 was produced*, complications in its full implementation and observing its success and failure. The study is aimed at creating awareness about NAP, and tries to generate understanding about Pakistan's countering terrorism efforts and its vitality.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

McConnell (2010) study tells, policy framers 'the proponents' always claim the success of their policy while not-framers 'the opponents' in opposition to that would term the policy as a failure; the difficulty is multi-dimensions of a policy and when success in some aspects failure is there in others; Policy has three domains: processes, programs and politics. Thus, "policies may fail or succeed along with a spectrum of success, resilient success, conflicted success, precarious success or failure and that success must differ in forms e.g. 'good politics' but 'bad policy' (McConnell, 2010).

Nalbandov (2017) research focused on dependent and independent variable for the success and failure of 'CT-Policies'. His case studies included EU, Russian Federation, United States, Sri Lanka and Israel. He noted the difference in the nature of terrorist threat e.g. domestic form, foreign and transnational or hybrid, all "acts as the antecedent variable affecting the choice of the diverse CT-Policies." He supposes the successful policy could be generated by seriously considering the correlation between independent variables (nature of CT-Policies) and dependent variables (instances of terrorism) (Nalbandov, 2017).

María Aznar in the study titled, *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations*, examines the 'CT-Strategies' and policies adopted by six countries belonging to different world regions during 70's which minimized threats of terrorism to those nations. The strategies could have an impact on CT-Policy building in today's world. The case studies include the countries e.g. United States, France, Germany, Italy, Egypt, and Sri Lanka. The study shows that there is no complete or short term remedy of terrorism, and counter terrorism strategies could bear mix results of success and failure, effectiveness and ineffectiveness of CT-Strategies and policies. But it provides an ultimate insight for policymakers who work on counter-terrorism policy building in the post 9/11 world (Aznar, 2006).

The US Department of State's web (2019) tells about the recent strategies implied for CT by US and host countries. The US is working on engaging international partners e.g. government members, religious leaders and tech companies to counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment both web-based and offline. They also work on establishing messaging strategies to counter disinformation and propaganda. Besides, they also support international community initiatives and adaptation of new policies and practices aimed at countering terrorism and radicalization (US Department of the State, 2019).

METHODS AND ORGANIZATION

The study is based on qualitative format of research taking into consideration both primary and secondary data sources. During the completion of research, the available sources that were consulted include books, articles, printed and electronic information and thematic interviews with senior journalists and experts of the issue. First, the data was collected taking into account the requirements of the study, then analyzed and presented under content analysis format. Both snow ball and purposive sampling procedures were applied during interviews.

First part of the research is introductory, the second part tells about Pakistan's active role in war on terror, the ramification associated e.g. the surfacing of traditional and non-traditional security challenges to Pakistan. The third section takes into consideration CT-Policy building at regional level. The fourth section analyzes the early CT-Strategies implied by Pakistan which includes MOs and Peace agreements with militants while the fifth section considers Pakistan's CT-Policy response in face of growing terrorism, extremism and militancy. However, a brief conclusion of the study is given at the end of the study.

POST 9/11 CHALLENGES TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan got the current waves of Terrorism in the post Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) period. The militants hiding in Pakistan's FATA region had a strategy to operate from civilian populated

areas. Due to this reason, difficulties were created for security enforcement agencies to curtail the growing power of terrorists. Terrorism posed both traditional and NT-Security challenges to Pakistan. Terrorism, extremism and sectarianism all undermine national security therefore, posing traditional security challenges to Pakistan. (Javaid, 2006).

Pakistan is the country, fighting for its fate of democracy against the growing extremism, terrorism and sectarianism. These 'ISMs' have shaken the very existence of the country. Pakistan's active frontline role in war on terror, to support the international resolve against radical elements of Islamic terrorism who were working against liberal thoughts and democracy brought knee-jerk reaction to Pakistan. Pakistan is a modern Muslim country tending towards the course of democracy under the essence of Islam. But the radicals do not admire such forms and modernity rather they want old-fashioned versions of radicalism under 'the umbrella of religion of Islam'. All the ISMs described above have similarity of visions and idealism. For example, if thought of, Terrorism is the philosophy worked out by radicals who are also known as extremists and these extremists envision a society having their-ideals which promote sectarianism. So, at the end they are all bullets of the same pistol.

The conservative and Jihadist orientations developed by Al-Qaeda and supported by Afghan Taliban regime were very aggressively rejected by the west. In Islam the subject of Jihad is very comprehensive and there is a demarcation between *Defensive Jihad* and *Offensive Jihad*. The defensive Jihad is the state's legitimate right to protect itself and its people from an outside aggressor or adversary. Terrorism is taken as offensive form against established norms of Islam internationally. The ongoing study takes offensive jihad as a means of insurgent activities by militants and non-state actors against Pakistan, a Muslim state.

During a correspondence with Raheemullah Yousafzai (senior journalist) when asked that does he see Pakistan more secure before 9/11 or after 9/11. He replied that he thought Pakistan was more secure before 9/11 but due to the US intervention in Afghanistan, there was negative fallout of the Afghan conflict on Pakistan and Pakistan became insecure, still it is facing the challenges e.g. militancy, extremism and terrorism (Yousafzai, personal communication, Dec. 14, 2019).

In the case of Pakistan, the offensive jihadists or terrorists worked to dismantle the moderate Islamic state run by democratic machinery and impose their version of Islam (the conservative form) or to challenge the writ of government and undermine the authority of the state because it facilitated infidel state's action against them e.g. Pakistan's active role in GWOT against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. In the non-Muslim states, the aim of the offensive jihad is to oppose the capitalist systems, more specifically the western format of politics, economy and institutions. In the non-Muslim states, the aim of terrorist activities is to oppose the liberal democratic and capitalist systems specially the monopoly of western format of politics, economy and institutions. Ajmal Abbasi, an expert on regional issues, during his correspondence with the researcher told: "That the war on terror brought both traditional and non-traditional security threats for Pakistan – the country had to face the anger of thousands of holy warriors, once created by Islamabad in collaboration with the west, and on the behest of USA to fight war against the Red Army (Ajmal Abbasi, personal communication, Nov. 21, 2019).

The traditional and non-traditional challenges have made national security landscape according to Afzal (2012) “more complex and vulnerable than even before.” The challenges also push the country for sectarian violence and ethnic divide. In this way national security as well as human security is threatened. Due to non-traditional security threats violence has gravely increased (Afzal, 2012). Thus, the rising internal insecurity is not only creating traditional and non-traditional challenges but also negatively impacts the state’s economy.

THREE DIMENSIONAL CT-RESPONSES: GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL

Global Level CT-Response

If looked into the matter of terrorism and approach of different world entities, to a maximum all the UN member countries adopted different CT-regimes and mechanisms to meet the challenge. The UN Global CT-Strategy was adopted in 2006, in the form of a resolution and annexed plan of action. The plan is a comprehensive working strategy to enhance global, regional and national level CT-efforts. All the UN members agreed to adopt mechanisms in conformity with the UN guidelines. “The Strategy is the first ever comprehensive, collective and internationally approved framework for tackling the problem of terrorism” (un.org).

The UN ‘IV-Pillars’ is a unique and comprehensive formula to strengthen state’s capacity against terrorism. It first asks for preventive measures to control the spread of terrorism then build combat strategies. The formula envisages respect for human rights and rule of law as the fundamental basis of fight against terrorism. The strategy facilitates the member states in adopting national level strategies and policies in conformity with UN directives to integrate the three dimensional efforts (national, regional, global) to combat terrorism. The UN-GA has reaffirmed the importance of the strategy for its members and recognizing the role of UN and Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and all regional and international entities in this regard (un.org). Presently, the UNSC and U.S and NATO are working on CT-Strategies worldwide e.g. the GWOT and different large scale and small scale operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen etc. against Al-Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist organization.

Regional Level CT-Response

EU, the premier of modern and developed Europe adopted broader mechanism to minimize the threats emanating especially from Middle East and North Africa. It developed CT-Strategies in accordance with UN IV-Pillars approach e.g. state’s capacity building with regard to border control, criminal investigation and prosecution and countering terror financing; consolidating rule of law and respect for human rights; enhancing regional cooperation; and preventing and combating terrorism (Gaub & Pauwels, 2017). The CT-Policies adopted by EU proposed greater cooperation on the part of EU member states which was not achieved because the member countries were hesitant of cooperation in some respects.

Examined by a recent research, the main shortcomings during the regional level of CT-cooperation were noted e.g. the members were not ready to share intelligence information with other countries; while others preferred bilateral agreements sidelining regional procedures; the Europol did not have the powers to make arrests and could have the capacity of only exchanging information with the concerned country’s police; there was lack of executive power within EU; there were

bureaucratic problems regarding consultancy and coordination works; and the European CT-Centre was slow producing results (Alsumaidaie, 2017).

But another research tells about the Efficacy of EU external strategies in CT. “The EU’s ability to mobilize resources on such a scale demonstrates responsiveness, while the geographical scope of its actions speaks of reach – The EU’s external assistance has largely focused on two pillars of the CT Strategy: Prevent and Pursue” (Glazzard & Reed, 2018). The preventive strategy is focusing on different engagement tools to stop non-state actors (terrorists) from violence for achievement of their political goals. There are mainly two main response types to terrorism i.e. responding to it and averting violence. The first type is the use of coercive force to fight terrorism while the second is a working strategy to avoid tools that lead to terrorism and radicalism in society. Preventive CT-Strategy emphasizes on averting the terrorist attacks on innocent civilians (Eijkman & Schuurman, 2011). Despite all these initiatives by EU agencies and its member countries due to lack of coordination and cooperation, the efforts seem limited which did not prevent terrorism from occurring in different European countries and travel of its citizens to conflict zone to join terrorist organizations. “The RAND corporation research suggests, “despite the volume of CT and preventive countering violent extremism ‘PCVE’ initiatives established in recent years, the evidence base underpinning these remains limited and evaluation practice and investments are underdeveloped compared to the overall fields of CT and PCVE” (Bellasio, Hofman, Ward, & Nederveen, 2018).

Following the 9/11 terrorists’ attacks and the global resolve to fight terrorism, the commitment of ASEAN countries reformed and CT came in the shape of ‘ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to CT’ and adopted in November, 2001. It was aimed at strengthening regional cooperation against terrorism: best practices and information and intelligence sharing. ASEAN Convention on Countering Terrorism was a milestone which came into force in 2011. But regarding regional cooperation on the subject of terrorism it also lacks basic implementation and coordination of tools.

The member countries consider terrorism domestic and internal matter; there is also difference in the national level CT-Strategies, some members tend towards more militaristic options while others response through criminal justice procedure; the national law enforcement measure differs in interpretation and implementation which hampers regional level CT-efficacy (unodc.org, 2018). Other similar documents and procedures adopted by the forum are; Manila Declaration of 2017 which reaffirmed its commitment to devise CTs in compliance with UN global CT-Goals and to monitor and prevent the joining of international conflicts by foreign fighters. Through the Manila Declaration the ASEAN forum aims to counter radicalization and extremism which could lead to terrorism in all forms and manifestations. But like other regional organization the lack of coordination and implementation tools limit the achievement of objectives reached by the forum.

SAARC has been considered as one of the first regional organizations which showed its resolve against terrorism. The resolve came during its second Bangalore summit-1986, that terrorism must be eliminated from the region (unodc.org, 2018). Other important instruments include: SAARC regional convention on terrorism, 1987; additional protocol to SAARC regional convention in 2016. But due to lack of coordination and cooperation in this regard there has been low level of CT-Cooperation among SAARC member countries in the field of counter terrorism. One of the main causes for this low level of cooperation is historical Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Regardless of working on multilateral and regional agendas for countering terrorism, the SAARC states prefer working on

bilateral level and with extra-regional entities which hampers regional consensus building on the subject of countering terrorism.

National Level CT-Response by Pakistan

Pakistan's national level countering terrorism response is two pronged i.e., early CT-Strategies implying MOs and negotiations while the second phase includes the policy response from the government which was motivated by national consensus on CT in all its forms and manifestations.

CT-Strategies Implied by Pakistan

Pakistan has implied different strategies to meet the challenges faced by state and society in the wake growing terrorism and extremism. The state security agencies took formidable steps to maintain internal peace and security intact. Military operation has been one of the earliest tools applied by the state security agencies. The MO's though successful in inflicting heavy losses on TGs but also resulted in great collateral damage and huge Internal Displacement (IDPs). The TGs mostly tended towards easiest targets e.g. killing innocent civilians, women and children and destroyed educational institutions and casualties by suicide bombing all have ramifications on internal security (Khan, 2014).

The major-MOs carried out against TGs are: Operation Al-Mizam (2002-06); Operation Zalzal (2008-09); Operation Rah e Haq (2007); Operation Sher Dil (2008); Operation Rah e Rast (2009); Operation Rah e Nijat (2009); Operation Zarb e Azb (2014); Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017-18) (Khan, 2014, p. 230; pakistanarmy.gov.pk, 2009-2020). Tahir Khan an Islamabad based journalist during his correspondence with the author told that during his interview with Hikmatyar, the later admitted that "Afghanistan crises had always created security problems for Pakistan and this is reality" (Tahir Khan, personal communication, Mar. 18 2020).

The strong actions by military in the form of MOs increased retaliation by the militants in FATA and there was noted increase in suicide attacks (Abbasi, Khatwani, & Hussain, 2018). The MOs have brought mixed results, it broke the backbone of the TGs in FATA and PATA regions but is also destroyed the socio-political and economic structures (Khan, 2014). The MOs, according to one study, ended with a peace agreement with the TGs e.g. Shakai agreement with Nek Muhammad, Sararogha peace deal with Mehsud and Swat agreement with Sufi Muhammad (Abbasi, Khatwani, & Hussain, 2018). Raheemullah Yousafzai, a journalist, and an expert on Afghanistan, during his correspondence with the author told: "he thought that major MOs have stopped, 12 major MOs have been conducted by Pakistan army, the government signed a dozen of peace deals with militants in which two agreements were signed by the governments of ANP and PPP with Maulvi Fazalullah and Maulana Sufi Muhammad the other were done by military directly" (Yousafzai, personal communication, Dec. 14, 2019).

The deals were later wasted by the TGs which give them time and opportunity to reorganize and operate in more violent mode. This way, the law enforcement agencies were many times deceived by the militants who enabled the security agencies to produce fresh strategies to punish the peace-Violators. The data analysis from 2009 to 2018 showed that almost 27, 622 militants were killed in different violent incidents e.g. suicide attacks, border clashes, drone strikes, inter militant clashes and sectarian violence (Hussain, 2019). Pakistan government and military has adopted different

strategies and policies overtime for diminishing the scourge of militancy. The policies adopted by government and security agencies yielded mixed outcomes. Initial successes are there but complete success is still under way.

EFFICACY OF NATIONAL ACTION PLAN (NAP-2014)

National CT-Policy building in Pakistan began in 2008 with the establishment of NACTA a federal government entity modeled after the US Department of Homeland Security and Directorate of Intelligence. The prime objective of the authority is to act as a coordinating body between national security apparatus and government policy to take possible and timely measures to counter terrorism and extremism. NACTA was made an independent body by National Counter Terrorism Act, 2013 which increased the jurisdiction of the authority making it directly answerable to the Prime Minister.

NACTA designed the first ever National Security Policy (NISP 2014-18) to respond the emerging threats to the national security of the country. The prime objective of the policy was isolating terrorists from their support bases. The mandate of NACTA includes variety of tasks ranging from counterterrorism to political and operational interventions (EASO, 2019).

The most important task outlined by the policy was capacity building of national security forces; curbing terror financing; Madrassa reform and registration of Afghan refugees. The policy itself was an important initiative, and was carried out keeping in view the prevailing security conditions but it met failure in its beginning in attaining the desired goals due to lack of coordination and consensus about the implementation of the policy between the civilian government and military establishment. The government was unable to facilitate the providence of funding worthy Rs. 32 billion (\$ 305 USD) which is one of the major cause of the early failure of the policy.

However, lack of coordination and consensus in the implementation of the NISP led to the tragedy of Army Public School attack in 2014. The attack was a blow to the national security apparatus and government policy wings which was carried by TTP; the banned terrorist organization operating from Afghanistan. The attack left 150 people dead which also included 132 children (Walsh, 2014). Other similar incidents e.g. attacks in Mastung and Safoora organized a national level consensus among politicians, civil society, government and military establishment for combining coordinated efforts to root out the menace of terrorism from Pakistan. NISP does not give ample direction and a time-frame for the achievement of these objectives (Saffee, 2015).

A broader national policy called National Action Plan (NAP-2014) was announced by the government. PM Nawaz Sharif told in a televised address to the nation that on one side are coward terrorists while on the other stands the whole nation (Khan, Ali, & Gabol, 2016). The analysts consider NAP-2014 a haphazard policy that lack proper counter terrorism strategy, coherence and vigor. NAP-2014, implemented in 2015, have a 20 points CT-formula, and the main objectives outlined are: formation of military courts; execution of terrorists; no armed militia to be allowed in the country; to strengthen the mandate of NACTA; reform and regulation of Madrassa; ban media coverage to terrorist organization; reforms in FATA and Balochistan; zero tolerance for militancy in metropolitan outfits; and, effective policy to deal the issues relating to Afghan refugees. The thing to be noted is that the apex court of the country hold jurisdiction under judicial review about the decisions of military courts.

When the C-T strategies e.g. NACTA, NAP was discussed with Raheemullah Yousafzai, he told, “the twenty points formula announced in 2015 came one month after the terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar and if there had been no attack, no NAP would have been formulated.” He was of the view that the policy response to terrorism came very late and it took almost twelve to thirteen years to initiate a CT-Policy building. About the implementation of the plan he told, “the policy has not been fully implemented and there are hurdles and challenges because Pakistan Army has many political, economic and security issues.” He further told that the focus of attention was not always “fighting terrorist or implementing the NAP but the attention was diverted to other issues like political issues and issues in the court and the kind of things” (Personal communication, Dec. 14,).

Notwithstanding its hasty implementation, there has been noted commendable improvement in law and order situation since the policy has been implemented in 2015. Terrorism has been greatly decreased ever since the policy was implemented and writ of government is gradually established in the country. According to survey reports terrorism declined up to 29% in the country in the year 2018 (Khan & Rafique, 2019). In technical terms both NISP and NAP should not be called “counter terrorism policies” per se, rather these policies provide for taking security measures amid growing terrorism (Zahid, 2016). NAP is the outcome of national level resolve against terrorism by all political sections, civil and military coherence. The special trial courts have done tremendous job so far in processing almost five hundred cases under speedy trials. “Visible progress is only on 4 points of NAP which largely relate to LEAs and are actively pursued whereas the progress on remaining points is still lagging behind” (Arshad, 2017).

Pakistan knows that MOs is not the only solution, it would only create a space for creating a comprehensive policy in the political and socio-economic sectors to try to win the hearts and minds of the people and ultimately win the war against terrorism. This is the reason, Yousafzai told the researcher, that Pakistan is still occasionally facing terrorist attacks though there has been a bit decline in the attacks and now Pakistan, to a greater extent is secure and peaceful; but the problem is still not fully resolved, the militants are down but not yet eliminated (Yousafzai, personal communication, Dec. 14, 2019).

Recent studies explore that the aim of NAP was to strengthen NACTA but its outcomes are not well established. NAP-2014 shows a national level commitment to fight terrorism but the hurdles in its implementation could not be ignored because in the last four years no institution has taken full responsibility for its implementation (Khan & Rafique, 2019). The Government claimed effective implementation whereas the army, judiciary, media and civil society have been expressing dissatisfaction over it (PILDAT, 2017). The mandate of NAP is beyond counter terrorism as it emphasizes on addressing structural and governance issues e.g. government regulation of Madrassas, controlling hate speech and mainstreaming FATA (embassyofpakistanusa, 2017).

Pakistan military has been fighting tooth and nail to remove terrorist threats from the country and it has achieved major successes in Swat and Waziristan but still the sword is waving as Pakistan cannot become peaceful and secure unless Afghanistan is not peaceful. Raheemullah Yousafzai claimed that: “If peace is established in Afghanistan after peace talks with Taliban, Pakistan would like the safe havens [terrorists] for the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch separatists to be removed from Afghanistan. Though Pakistan has achieved a lot of success but complete victory has not yet been

achieved” (Yousafzai, personal communication, Dec. 14, 2019). The main hurdles in the implementation of NAP are: a) Lack of proper implementation mechanism; b) Oversight of NAP; and, c) No KPI devised; and, lack of uniform reporting mechanisms (Pakistan Institute for Conflict & Security Studies, 2017).

Table 1: Fatalities due to Terrorism from 2000 to 2018

Year	Civilians	Security Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
2000	45	0	0	45
2001	29	9	0	38
2002	88	7	44	139
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	3001	676	1702	5379
2014	1781	533	3182	5496
2015	940	339	2403	3682
2016	612	293	898	1803
2017	540	208	512	1260
2018	369	165	157	691

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan has been the most effected country from terrorism, ‘the 21st century scourge.’ It faced the wrath of terrorism of all the major terrorist organizations of the world including Al-Qaeda and ISIS. These organizations mixed with local brands e.g. TTP, its affiliates and Baloch insurgents created traditional and non-traditional challenges for the state. Pakistan’s early CT-Strategies worked on ‘response building’ e.g. MOs and short lived peace talks. But the strategies though collecting few achievements did not present a holistic solution to the scourge. Then, came government policy response in the shape of NISP but it also did not prove holistic and resulted in a more comprehensive mechanism under National Action Plan, 2014-15 after the tragic Army Public School incident.

The study shows that this policy lacks vision and commitment to resolve the scourge holistically. The policy is considered, shaped in a ‘haphazard manner’ lacking proper coordination and

implementation mechanisms. There are also budgetary and economic issues in the way of its proper implementation. Also, the lack of cooperation and coordination among the major stakeholders e.g. military establishment, intelligence wings, government and political sections add to the non-fulfillment of the policy goals. Notwithstanding, many weaknesses that the policy held still there has been noted worthy improvement in national security architecture. The data shows a decline in terrorist activities and resultant fatalities which also tells about the procurement of the policies. After analyzing other entities performance in the field of counter terrorism e.g. EU, ASEAN, and SAARC at regional levels it becomes imperative that Pakistan's national-level response to terrorism is much better compared to others. This study concludes that the response of regional organizations is not very encouraging in this regard which also adds to the weakening of national-level CT-Response. Thus, many national, regional and international factors are responsible for the weakening of national-level CT-Response.

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