PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND THE INDIAN SUPPORT FOR TAMIL INSURGENCY IN SRI LANKA

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Abstract

The paper analyses India's intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka as well as former's overt or covert support to Tamil rebels in the country. It utilizes the principal-agent theory that helps understand as to why, how and under what conditions a state uses militant groups as its proxies in a neighboring state. The study explores why and how New Delhi used Tamil rebels as its proxies in Sri Lanka. India's RAW provided finance, weapons, training, and sanctuaries to Tamil guerillas fighting for a separate state in Sri Lanka. India also provided political support to the rebels and attempted to cover its real objectives under the veil of a peace broker. It had diverse strategic, political, and economic objectives and used terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy. It cultivated and used Tamils as its proxies to undermine the security and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and curtail the latter's sovereignty in order to exploit certain benefits and extract undue concessions.

Key Words: conflict, India, Sri Lanka, Tamil, insurgency, terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

South Asian countries (SACs) are diverse religiously, socially, culturally, and ethnically. For illustration, India has 6 main religious groups and huge cultural diversity with around 780 sub-dialects inscribed in 66 diverse scripts, 122 major languages (vocalized by more than 10,000 people) and 22 official vernaculars (Singh, 2013). The rest of SACs are also multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. All SACs are dominated by at least a single religious group, i.e. Hindus in India and Nepal, Muslims in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Maldives and Buddhists in Sri Lanka and Bhutan. In India and Nepal, Hindus makeup 79.8 percent and81.3 percent of populace respectively, while 96.4 percent and 89.1 percent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi population, respectively, profess Islam and this number is 100percent in the case of Maldives. In Sri Lanka and Bhutan, Buddhists constitute 70.2percent and 75.3 percent, respectively of their population. Hindus make up the largest minority group in four SACs, i.e. Bhutan (22.1 percent), Sri Lanka (12.6 percent), Bangladesh (10 percent), and Pakistan (1.6 percent). Muslims makeup the major minority group in India (14.2 percent) and the second main minority both in Sri Lanka (9.7 percent) and Nepal (4.4 percent). In Nepal, Buddhists (9percent) make up the chief minority (CIA, 2016; Majid 2014; pp. 1-2).

Ethnic and religious dissimilarities pose serious challenges to the security and stability of SACs. Various religious and cultural minority groups residing in different SACs pose perceived or genuine threats and create troubles and grievances, generate and stir up tensions within and between regional countries. The religious and ethnic divisions besides other issues mainly cause intra- and interstate conflicts and sometimes lead to internal strife and international wars in South Asia (Khan, 1991, pp. 48-9). Sometimes, these conflicts also stimulate intervention from neighboring countries.

The failure of the ruling elites of SACs to grant or successfully guard the political and economic interests of their respective religious and ethnic minorities generally caused displeasure and uprisings in their states. The religious and ideological differences, perceived political estrangement,

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ethnic and socio-cultural sensitivities, and economic exploitation and overall sense of deprivation or dissatisfaction with the existing system impelled them to ultimately revolt against the state, seek autonomy or even complete separation. For instance, India is faced with several separatist movements while Pakistan was disintegrated in 1971. Internal conflicts, including insurgencies and civil wars over and over again, challenged the national security and territorial integrity of SACs and occasionally ignited interstate tensions in South Asia. Though the political elites of the respective countries are mainly responsible for contributing to these conflicts (Sobhan, 1998), the role of neighboring states to inflate them has also been instrumental. As Gonsalves noted, non-state actors posed serious threats to the stability and territorial integrity of South Asian states and some of them were supported by neighboring countries. "No major country in the subcontinent can claim to have clean hands in this context" (Gonsalves 2006, p. 207).

India generally accuses its neighbors, particularly Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism and subversive activities on its soil. For instance, a former Indian Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, once observed: "India is a country wounded by terrorism. Virtually all our neighbors, by choice or default, by acts of commission or omission, compulsions of geography or terrain, have been or are involved in receiving, sheltering, overlooking or tolerating terrorist activities from their soil directed against India" (Muni 2003a, p. 185). Despite New Delhi's such assertions, India's own hands are not clean in this respect. As Gonsalves noted, non-state actors posed serious threats to the stability and territorial integrity of South Asian states and some of them were supported by neighboring countries. "No major state in the subcontinent can claim to have clean hands in this context," he maintained (Gonsalves, 2006, p. 207). New Delhi's role and behavior towards insurgencies, and terrorism faced by smaller regional countries (SRCs) are worth exploring.

This paper analyzes India's behavior towards insurgency in Sri Lanka. The following section offers a detailed evaluation of India's intervention in the national affairs of Sri Lanka as well as its overt or covert support to the militant groups in the state.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study borrows from Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, who applied the principal-agent Theory (PAT) to help explicate external backing to rebel groups. Foreign states use it as a mean of the maneuvers to get their opponents emasculate through delegating the conflict to a willing militant group. This tool is utilized to substitute or augment other strategies designed to intimidate opponents, such as the imposition of sanctions, embargo, or direct military action as part of "coercive bargaining" strategies. Foremost condition is the willingness on the aspect of an external power to sponsor the militant group, and readiness on the part of the latter to suffer it. An outside power can support a militant group when it determines that the cost of direct military intervention would be too gamey and is gratified that it has the "ability to select and monitor appropriate agents," i.e. some terrorist groups (Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham, 2011, pp. 711-3).

In the contemporary World, waging war through proxies has become more pronounced than outright military intervention and hence more attractive because the former is less expensive than the latter in several respects: foremost, outright military intervention is quite open that cannot be camouflaged; it gets widespread condemnation or criticism at the global level and may lead to the imposition of sanctions by the international community and other retaliatory measures by

sympathizers or allies of the victim state that may draw them into the conflict. Also, it can be also expensive in terms of its price, such as potential casualties and resource expenditures, i.e. military and economic resources, time and knowledge, etc. Direct military intervention require military troops, armaments, advisors, finance and risks lives of soldiers that can provoke discontent and war-weariness at domestic level. On the other hand, use of militant groups as proxies is cost-efficient in terms of resource commitment as it only calls for assurance of equipment, finance, training, advisors, and logistic support, etc. generally in a secret way making it difficult to judge. It does not risk the lives of soldiers or fear of international public opinion. Even if militant groups commit brutality, human rights violations, the bad behavior of whatever sort and war crimes, etc. the sponsoring state can easily detach itself from such acts through publicly denying its "complicity with or knowledge of" it. Support for local terrorist groups in conflicts provide additional benefits, such as more dependable information about the soil, people, critical infrastructure, government plans and informants, etc. Such groups also enjoy more sympathies and legitimacy among local people than foreign invaders who are unwelcome (Salehyan et al., 2011, pp. 712-4).

There can be diverse motives behind a state's decision to support terrorists as proxies in the neighboring countries. More often than not they are political and security related. A state can use militant groups to destabilize or coerce another state because of: some dispute or incompatibility of policy, political orientation or interests with the latter, or; some sympathies with armed rebels or militant groups due to ideological, religious, ethnic or cultural affinities or some shared political and economic aims. The act of sponsoring a militant group takes an important foreign policy decision and depends on the nature of relations with the victim state / regime. The objectives of sponsoring a militant group may include: to weaken and coerce a rival state in parliamentary procedure to find more or less leverage or to extract concession on some policies, territorial or political disputes or to overthrow an "unfriendly" government (Salehyan et al., 2011, p. 712).

Among the target countries, those involved in international disputes or rivalries provoke external powers to support militant groups. An external force may use militant groups to undermine, weaken or coerce a state involved in a militarized conflict, territorial dispute, and political or ideological struggle. However, reinforcement of a terrorist group by an external power can incite other foreign countries to oppose such activities by holding the opposite side (victim or target country). Such an intervention can, however, prolong the conflict (Salehyan et al., 2011, p. 720).

External powers use terrorist groups when they both have some identical preferences and the former can "select good, competent agents" and can "effectively monitor" agents' actions and "sanction [their] bad behaviour." The state's decision to select a militant group is based on the latter's "ability to pose a viable threat to the target regime and the degree of preference congruence." States generally select more capable groups with clear and centralized organizational structure and strong leadership that can efficiently and effectively coordinate and execute a course of action. Shared ethnic, spiritual, political and ideological affinities and preferences are significant agents in agent-selection. Common culture and terminology can be helpful in monitoring the agents' actions and cuts the danger of "agency slack" (Salehyan et al., 2011, p.715).

Acceptance of external assistance involves both incentives and disincentives for militant groups. Foreign assistance comes with "strings attached" to it due to which such groups lose some level of self-sufficiency. They lose control over their aims and actions, though they bring much-needed

resources. Such groups make tradeoffs between autonomy and resources though they desire to maximize both of them. Still, they bear to compromise their autonomy in society to get foreign funding as they generally face "resource disadvantage." Faced with a conflict against well-organized and better-equipped state machinery, the militant groups are generally resourced deficient as they lack manpower, money, training, and equipment badly needed to challenge the government to make their objectives such as: to extract maximum concessions; topple down the regime; acquire autonomy or complete independence. In each instance, these groups demand to "mobilize a significant military capability" that require patrons within or outside the state. External powers as opposed to domestic sponsors potentially can offer far more resources; such as money, training, sanctuaries, and equipment (Salehyan et al., 2011, pp.715-7).

The warring groups with sufficient domestic resource base are less probable to be beholden to foreign aid that could compromise their autonomy. Also, too much reliance upon a foreign country, particularly alliance with a perceived enemy state can seriously weaken the authenticity of such groups at the domestic stage. Such groups are viewed as pawns by enemies or external powers that can lose confidence and backing of the local citizenry. However, preferences convergence and religious, ethnic, cultural, ideological and political affinities can ameliorate this dilemma (Salehyan et al., 2011, pp. 716-7).

INDIA'S SUPPORT TO TAMIL INSURGENCY IN SRI LANKA

The Indian sub-continent throughout most parts of its history remained divided into smaller and medium-sized states except on three functions when it was unified by military unit. Chandragupta Maurya, the founding father of the Maurya Dynasty (321 - 185 BC), was the first to unite the entire India. He was assisted in his conquests by his Prime Minister Kautilya, generally known as Chanakya. His Empire reached its zenith during the convention of his grandson Asoka the Great (273 - 232 BC) and it was stretched over present-day Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. It was, however, fragmented into numerous states after his demise. India's glory was revived under the Gupta Empire (320-550) particularly in the reign of Chandragupta II (380-415 AC). In the post-Gupta period, India gradually became separated. After several hundred years of internal discord and political divisions India was unified again by military means by Muslims; first, under the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) and then Mughal rule (1526-1857). As the Mughal Empire degenerated due to different reasons, the British under the East India Company (1608-1858) rose to capture entire India (Chandra, 2008, pp. 28-58). In the post-war era, the weakening British rule could not have its overseas colonies and had to let go of its Indian Empire after dividing it into two states, India and Pakistan. The British rule (1858-1947) integrated the region through administrative and political systems and an "extensive communication network" (Bokhari 1985, p. 372). The British Empire was, however, stretched beyond the present-day boundaries of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Muni claimed that Sri Lanka and Myanmar were separated from British India in 1937 **(**Muni 2003b, p. 2). The British had also got the rights to run foreign affairs of Afghanistan in 1880 which Kabul regained in 1910 (Christensen, 2001; pp. 14-7). British Indian Empire also exercised considerable influence in parts of West Asia including Iran, Iraq, Arabia, and Eastern Africa and Siam, Tibet and Eastern Turkestan (Onley 2009, pp. 44-62). The British had made Sikkim as its protectorate and the latter also received the rights to direct trade and build roads in the country. Nepal and Bhutan, also British protectorates, were given autonomy in their domestic affairs while their foreign relations

were guided or conducted by the British (Rose, 1969; Deepak 2012, pp. 246-7). Nevertheless, the British Indian Empire came to an end after the Second World War and the Indian sub-continent had to be partitioned on communal lines.

The leaders of All India National Congress (AINC) were counterbalanced to the idea of partition and instead they wanted not just to hold the unity of India, but also to create a South Asian federation extending from Myanmar in the east to Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq in the west (Ahmad, 2014, p. 51). The communal divisions were then deep in South Asia that their dreams did not come true. Indian leadership, yet, did not stop harboring their goals through other means. To take on a major role in the world, politics and to dominate South Asia was their cherished goal. India wanted to behave as a regional policeman (Hagerty 1991, p. 363). They set the pursuit of Machiavellian realism as their principal means to this final stage in the region. Indian policy towards SRCs including Sri Lanka profoundly manifests it.

Rise of Tamil Insurgency: The Background

The British had united the separate Tamil and Sinhalese domains or states into a single unitary state in the nineteenth century (Jayahanthan, 2004; pp.143-4). With its declining position as a great power, Britain gave it first a dominion status and then full independence in 1947 and 1948, respectively. Since then, Sri Lanka strived to keep its political independence, internal security and territorial integrity against the threats primarily emanating, directly or indirectly, from India. It sought to determine its borders with India through the resolution of differences of opinions over the Gulf of Mannar and the Palk Strait (Ahmed, K. 2005, pp. 17-9). Colombo also signed a defense treaty with the UK on November 11, 1947 (Gooneratne, 2007, p. 54).

Struggle in Sri Lanka was rooted in the country's cultural, ethnic and religious diversity and it was subsequently intensified due to political and economic components. Sri Lanka is a multi-religious and multi-cultural country with Sinhalese predominantly Buddhist community forming 75 percent of the national population. Tamil community is predominantly Hindu that forms 15.4 percent of the country's population; it includes (11.2 percent) Sri Lankan Tamils and (4.2 percent) Indian Tamils. The majority of it is in the north and eastern sections of the state. Indian Tamils were brought as laborers to Sri Lanka by the British in the late 19th and early 20th C. British policies widened the gulf between Sinhalese and Tamils that was further aggravated after Sri Lanka got freedom from colonial rule. The language issue and government's resettlement policy that enabled about 165,000 Sinhalese to settle in Tamil dominated eastern and northern areas from 1953 to 1981 and the rise of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism created identity concerns among the Tamil population. Tamils regarded various moves by the government as efforts aimed at denying them their political and economic rights and "cultural oppression."

Aggrieved by various government policies, Tamil first decided to pursue their aims through political means. The failure on the constituent of the Sri Lankan ruling elite to address Tamils' concerns, led the latter to revolt against the province. In 1956, Tamils launched a non-violent civil disobedience movement that triggered majoritarian Sinhalese to stage retaliatory anti-Tamil riots and violent actions. Initially, Tamils demanded the creation of a Tamil province under a federal system, termination of resettlement policy, acceptance of the two-language policy, and the abolishment of nationality laws that did not recognize Indian Tamils. When an agreement with the

government did not materialize due to substantial opposition by Sinhalese nationalists, Tamils for the first time touched on to the existence of a historical Tamil "homeland" or Jaffna Kingdom that had subsisted between the thirteenth and sixteenth century. In the early 1970s, Tamils demanded the creation of a sovereign Tamil state (country). The subsequent constitutional and legal reforms further alienated Tamils who became united under the streamer of the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, renamed as Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1975. Meanwhile, Tamils also established several Tamil militant groups (TMGs), including the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) formed in 1972 which later on became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 1976. In the beginning, there were about 37 TMGs out of which the five, known generally as "the big five," were most substantial. TMGs started attacking police and armed forces, political leaders, civilians, robbing banks and were likewise implied in other criminal activities (Richards 2013, pp. 6-14). The Sri Lankan government took up security operations against the TMGs that forced the latter to seek refuge and financial backing from India which the latter provided.

India's Support to Tamil Tigers

India supported Tamil separatists through providing military training, equipment, and financial, political and diplomatic backing. The general public, leaders and political parties in a neighboring Indian state of Tamil Nadu were generally sympathetic to the concerns and cause of their "ethnic kin," especially after the anti–Tamil riots of 1977, in Sri Lanka. In order to appease voters and for other political considerations, the main political parties and groups in Tamil Nadu increasingly affiliated themselves with TMGs and started to provide them, training camps and other facilities. In 1979, Sri Lanka deployed its troops in Jaffna – the capital of Northern Province – that drove the LTTE leader Prabhakaran to flee to Tamil Nadu, which he practiced as a secure haven to conduct terrorist activities against Sri Lanka. New Delhi stepped up its support to TMGs as the dispute intensified in 1983 when Tamils launched a full-fledged war against Sri Lanka (Richards 2013, pp. 6-14; Gunaratna 1993).

India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used RAW to train and arm Tamil terrorists in Sri Lanka. Her aggressive behavior towards Indian neighbors is well recognized. Previously, under her premiership, India had militarily intervened in Pakistan and disintegrated the latter in 1971. She also forcefully annexed Sikkim in 1974. After ruling the country consecutively for 11 years (1966-1977), she was out of office following her party's defeat in the general elections in 1977. In 1980, she again became the prime minister after the new elections. Since southern Indian states had played main role in her victory in the elections, therefore, she had become "more sensitive than ever before" to the concerns of these states. The funding for the Tamil cause was strong in these states including Tamil Nadu. So, she determined to secretly support Tamils terrorists in Sri Lanka. Reportedly, she also had a "secret plan to invade" Sri Lanka which could not be executed because of her assassination by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984 (Bennet, 2013, pp. 48-9).

Gandhi had sanctioned RAW to arm and train TMGs as she looked for several goals. On the face of it, she desired to appease her voters in south Indian states. Meanwhile, she also intended to "curb the insurgency" that would serve two objectives: a) to keep Sri Lanka under pressure to get concessions on various issues, including Tamil problem and; b) to keep TMGs under control and pressure to accept the concessions to be announced by Colombo.

Indian RAW focused to strengthen the LTTE in order to advance its aims. With Indian support, LTTE unleashed a wave of terror against other TMGs and, through either eliminating or absorbing the others, it became a prevalent group in Jaffna with some 5000 cadres by the mid of the 1980s. In the former years, LTTE militants also got training by several Palestinian militant groups such as Al Fatah in the Middle East. But it was mainly India's RAW, which trained them in bases along with coastal areas in Tamil Nadu. In the 1980s, RAW trained and armed tens of thousands of Tamil militants to use self-loading rifles, semi-automatic and automatic weapons, rocket launchers and heavy weapons of various sorts besides preparing them for anti-tank warfare, guerilla warfare, such as laying mines, demolitions, mountaineering, and map reading, etc. RAW also helped LTTE to establish its control center which enabled the latter to assume total control of the Jaffna peninsula by 1985. By the previous 1980s, the LTTE had transformed itself into a force resembling a conventional army commanded by Prabhakaran. It consisted of ground troops (army), the Air Tigers (air power), the Sea Tigers (navy), the Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (intelligence service), and several civilian support units. Its ground troops included several brigades, including infantry, artillery, mortar, mining unit, armored and anti-tank units. It also had bodyguards and women brigades. Its elite army brigade or commandos included the Leopard commandos, Black Tigers (suicide unit) and the Special Forces. LTTE achieved all of it due to active Indian support that enabled the former to completely seize the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka (Richards, 2013, pp.14-6). RAW trained and armed about 15,000 Tamils between 1983 and 1988 (Bennet 2013, p. 48).

In the late 1980s, India more openly and vigorously supported Tamil insurgency. Initially, New Delhi politically supported the Tamil cause and place pressure on Colombo for a negotiated resolution. It kept on insisting Colombo gives the latter's Tamil community various sorts of concessions, including autonomy and offered to take on its role as a go-between. Nevertheless, Indian designs became more pronounced in the late 1980s, when it openly strived to infringe the Sri Lankan sovereignty. In 1987, when the Sri Lankan forces besieged Jaffna peninsula and visited the blockade to crush Tamil rebels, India after its failure to pressurize Colombo to uplift the siege, decided to intervene in Sri Lanka. It breached the blockade by airlifting supplies to the peninsula on the name of humanitarian assistance that soured bilateral ties of the two countries (Destradi 2010, p. 9). India called for the action on the pressure of political parties and leadership of Tamil Nadu, which by then reportedly looked after around 150000 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka (Ghosh 1999, pp. 87-9). Colombo condemned the Indian move and termed it as a "naked violation" of its independence and "unjustified assault" on its "sovereignty and territorial integrity." Indian action, nevertheless, compelled Sri Lanka to lift the blockade and terminate military operation in Jaffna. Colombo also agreed to a negotiated settlement (Rao 1988, pp. 433-4).

Both nations agreed in talks that resulted in the closing of a bilateral agreement on July 29, 1987. The agreement, signed by India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Junius Richard Jayewardene, provided for an immediate ceasefire, surrender of arms by Tamil rebels, withdrawal of the Lankan army from operations, and merger of northern and eastern provinces into a single unit with provincial autonomy and holding of elections for provincial council under Indian observation etc. Both countries agreed on certain obligations with security and foreign policy implications: an understanding with regard to the recruitment of foreign intelligence and military personnel; Colombo's commitment to not allow Trincomalee or any other port for military

use by any external power "detrimental" to Indian security concerns; and, foreign broadcasting services in Sri Lanka would not serve intelligence or military goals but only public purpose. In return, India agreed to deport Tamil insurgents present on its soil (Rao 1988, pp. 433-4).

Some of the conditions of the treaty were clear manifestations of India's hegemonic ambitions in the area. The agreement opened the way for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka as New Delhi made a commitment to militarily assist Colombo if requested by the latter. Gooneratne claimed that India's motives were complex. The correspondence with Sri Lanka had prescribed "several ground rules" for Sri Lanka to conduct its foreign policy. Under the agreement, New Delhi was able to deploy its 80,000 troops as an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka to "supervise a ceasefire and to disarm Tamils rebels" (Gooneratne 2007, p. 55). It lived up to India's long ambition to play its part as a regional "policeman." However, the move backfired and created strong resentment among both Sinhalese and Tamils. It worsened the problem as nationalist Sinhalese group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front or JVP), in its resistance to the deployment of IJKF, started militant activities and attacking governmental officials, including the President, Prime Minister, member of parliament, police and armed forces. JVP militancy and government counter-insurgency campaign claimed lives of between 50,000 to 70,000 people (Bennet 2013, pp. 8-9).

On the other hand, the LTTE started attacking Indian troops, which ultimately had to be withdrawn on Sri Lankan pressure in March 1990 (Ahmad 2017, pp. 52-5). Later, a Tamil Tigress (woman) killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who had signed the accord on behalf of his state, in a suicide attack during an election effort in 1991. Later on his assassination, India's central government's interests in Tamils declined. Nevertheless, Indian domestic political factors, such as the presence of Tamil Nadu based regional parties, e.g. the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, in coalition governments in New Delhi, kept Indian interest alive in Tamil issue in the 1990s (Gooneratne 2007, p. 55). During 2003-2009, India continued to sustain a "negotiated political settlement" that would include power decentralization and autonomy that could fulfill "the dreams of all communities." Since 2007, Indian policy was characterized by duplicity as it started providing Sri Lankan armed forces the military training and "defensive" equipment besides launching crackdowns on LTTE guerillas in Tamil Nadu. Meanwhile, it also conveyed its worries over alleged civilian casualties in Colombo's military campaign against the LTTE. In October 2008 it protested over Colombo's way to carry on the war and then its External Affairs Minister explicitly threatened that New Delhi would "'do all in its power' in order to ameliorate the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka" (Destradi 2010, pp. 12-6).

In 2009, LTTE was finally demolished after its humiliating defeat in the hands of Sri Lankan forces. Tamil insurgency that lasted for about 26 years took the lives of approximately 100,000 people. Moreover, it also caused the internal displacement of approximately 300,000 people (Destradi 2010, pp. 12-6; "Sri Lanka tipped to raise," 2011). In 2011, Sri Lanka Prime Minister, D. M. Jayaratne claimed that he had "intelligence reports of three clandestine training centres operated by the LTTE in Tamil Nadu" in India to revive the separatist movement in the country ("Tamil Tiger rebels training in India," 2011).

Tamils insurgency, cultivated and nourished by India's RAW, killed or tried to assassinate highest level government personalities including Presidents and Prime Ministers. 1993, Tamils killed, Sri Lanka's then President, Ranasinghe Premadasa, besides 10 other people in a suicide attack during

the May Day parade. Earlier they gunned down the country's one of the principal opposition leaders Lalith Athulathmudali (Garan, 1993).

Tamils not only unleashed a prolonged wave of terror in Sri Lanka but their felonious and fierce activities were also reported in neighboring states, i.e. India, the Maldives, and Pakistan. In 1991, they assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, India's former prime minister. Tamils' involvement was also accounted for in a failed coup against, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the then President of the Maldives in 1988 (Hagerty 1991 p. 362). As such, India's trained Tamil unleashed terror in the several countries of South Asia and proposed services as mercenaries to change the regime in the Maldives. The coup was finally charged with Indian help which was a presentment of its authority in the area. It was also a continuation of its role in "creation" of Bangladesh in 1971 and "interjection to resolve" Tamil issue in Sri Lanka in 1987 (Gill 1992, p. 58).

CONCLUSION

There were domestic factors that had the eruption of civil warfare in Sri Lanka but ultimately it became a regional dimension when India started supporting Tamil rebels. The trouble was primarily rooted in historical, cultural, socioeconomic and political elements that produced a sensory faculty of social alienation, economic loss and political entanglement among the Tamil minority. Tamil community initially strove to get resolve their fears and grievances through the political process and peaceful way. The Sri Lankan government, nevertheless, turned down their needs and instead took harsh measures to address the problem. Tamils decided to gross out and bring up arms that prompted the state to use security forces against them. As Tamil rebels found themselves unable to face security forces, they settled to seek foreign, i.e. Indian assistance. New Delhi was more than willing to hold up the Tamil insurgency due to its own political and strategic considerations.

India intensified the internal conflict of its neighboring nations by supporting the anti-state components. It provided political and diplomatic support to the demands and cause of the rebels and also secretly gave them finance, training, weapons, and sanctuaries to help them fight against Lankan security forces. India's secret agency RAW played a crucial part as it equipped terrorist groups, mainly LTTE, enabling it to unleash a wave of terror against the security forces, and civilians without discrimination.

As PAT informs, India used TMGs groups as its proxies to pursue its regional goals vis-à-vis Sri Lanka. Indian RAW chose LTTE is a "safe and competent agent" and also because they both possessed a degree of identical preferences. To Indian support, the LTTE was able to pose a grave threat to Sri Lanka, the target state. RAW helped the LTTE to make a centralized organizational structure and strong leaders capable of efficiently and effectively coordinating and carrying through a path of a natural process. Both India and LTTE shared ethnic, spiritual, ethnic political and ideological affinities. Due to these agents, India expected that it could "effectively monitor" LTTE's actions and "sanction" its "bad behavior." However, as soon as their interests and preferences diverged after the Indo-Lankan peace agreement of 1987, India suffered because of the "agency slack," LTTE turned against New Delhi. Even one of its female members killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a suicide attempt in 1991.

India attempted to exploit the state of affairs in Sri Lanka for its advantage for various strategic and political grounds. India's RAW played key part in cultivating terrorism and inciting civil war in Sri Lanka. RAW provided Tamil rebels the finance, training, weapons, and sanctuaries besides political support by the central and state governments. Evidently, New Delhi supported Tamil insurgents mainly because of their cultural and spiritual affinities with its people and principally on the pressure of political parties and groups. Still, India also experienced close to political and strategic targets. It tried to disintegrate Sri Lanka, as it did to Pakistan in 1971, to increase/extend its influence in the area. Tamils who mainly adhered to Hinduism were naturally included towards India and thus could possibly be included in the Indian union at a later point. New Delhi also endeavored to make some "ground rules" for its relations with Colombo aimed at reinforcing the former's preeminence in the part. India proved to position itself as a regional police officer at the expense of independence and sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

Nonetheless, New Delhi used terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy in order to first weaken its neighbors and then to impose its dictates. It cultivated Tamil insurgents as its proxies to undermine the security and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, respectively. India's use of Tamils as its proxy is more articulated. India by using Tamil insurgency was able to impose on Sri Lanka a bilateral treaty that severely undermined the latter's reign. It provided India an opportunity to transport its military personnel in Sri Lanka apparently to guarantee peace in the land. Still, it had far-reaching implications. It was a demonstration of India's power and influence in the South Asian region where New Delhi, wanted to demonstrate its dominance and take on the role of a regional police officer. It demonstrates the extent to which a more powerful state can manipulate events, particularly in case of national conflicts, unrest, rebellion, insurgency or civil war in its neighborhood to the former's advantage.

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